



The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. By
Richard M. Titmuss. New York: Pantheon Books, 1971. Pp. '39. 6.95
(clothbound).
The subtitle of this extraordinarily interesting book gives a fair in-
dication of its ambitions. Most of it is a detailed comparison of two alter-
native ways of organizing the collection and allocation of human blood
for transfusion and similar purposes. On this level, it appears to be-
and probably is-a devastating and unanswerable indictment of the
American system as inferior to the British in efficiency, morality, and
attractiveness. From this secure beachhead, Professor Titmuss launches
a broad attack on the market as a mechanism for the mobilization and
allocation of scarce resources, and, even more generally, on the whole
economizing mode of thought which-as he might have said if he were
a different sort of man-knows the price of everything and the value of
nothing. On this broader front he scores some important points but is
ultimately confused. I hope to show that what arouses Titmuss's anger
and scorn is usually not, as he thinks, the use of economic reasoning but
its misuse. There is a lesson here for everyone interested in social policy,
because some economists do have a way of drifting into sharp proposi-
tions that cannot be fully supported even on narrowly economic
grounds. But blood first, thunder afterward.
I.
In Great Britain, the collection and allocation of blood is entirely in
the hands of the National Blood Transfusion Service as an integral part
of the National Health Service. (The actual functioning is decentralized
through Regional Transfusion Centres corresponding roughly to the
Regional Hospital Boards.) Essentially all blood is collected from volun-
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tary donors who receive no reward but a cup of tea. Blood is allocated
from the Regional Centres to hospitals by negotiated quota; there is
provision for renegotiation of quotas, for special allocation of emergency
supplies, and for national pooling of rare blood types. Hospitals do not
have to pay for the blood they use, nor do the patients who ultimately
receive transfused blood. (Even private patients who have contracted
out of the National Health Service receive blood free from the Service.)
There is apparently no explicit or implied obligation to replace blood
used by oneself or one's family, or to earn insurance credits by supplying
blood in advance. In fact, in a sample survey slightly over a quarter of
donors report that they or a member of their immediate family have
received blood in the past. Since it seems unlikely that as many as a
quarter of all immediate families have members who have received
transfusions, the receipt of blood is probably a motive for subsequent
giving by the recipient or his relatives. But there is no accounting sys-
tem for such gifts, and presumably no unpleasant pressure to pay back.
Donors appear to be broadly, though not exactly, representative of
the population at large: males and the young are over-represented for
obvious reasons; "professional, etc." occupations are over-represented
and semi-skilled and unskilled occupations are under-represented,
though it is impossible to say how much of this social-class bias repre-
sents differences in past and present health and therefore in eligibility.1
Blood is thus completely removed from the marketplace. It is sup-
plied at zero fee and used at zero price. Recipients do not even know
whom to thank.
In the United States, by contrast, there is no unified system for the
collection and distribution of blood, but rather a variety of differen-
tiated institutions. One of the consequences is that it is impossible to
assemble comprehensive statistical information on any sort of uniform
basis. There is a large element of guesswork, therefore, in any picture
of how the apparatus actually works.
Titmuss classifies blood banks into five classes. (1) Red Gross Regional
Blood Centers, based on 1700 local chapters, contribute about forty
per cent of the total supply. (2) About one hundred non-profit com-
munity blood banks are believed to account for fifteen to twenty per
cent of the total. (3) Some 6000 hospital blood banks are responsible
for twenty to thirty per cent. (4) An unknown number of profit-making
commercial blood banks, generally getting blood from paid donors,
1. See generally R. Tmfuss, THE GF RE.urxoNsnm': Fnou HumAN BLOow To SocuAL
Poucy 124-41 (1971) [hereinafter cited to page number only].
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processing it, and selling it to hospitals, were believed in the early 1960s
to account for some ten to fifteen per cent of the total supply; but
Titmuss and others believe their role has increased since then. (5) An
unknown number of commercial blood banks directly operated by
pharmaceutical firms supply plasma, plasma protein components and
platelets obtained from paid donors by a new method called plasma-
pheresis. 2 (In plasmapheresis, the red cells are separated immediately
from the plasma and injected back into the donor. It is claimed by
some authorities that a single donor can safely give blood several times
a week by this method, provided his health is good and his diet appro-
priate; but the technique is new, and apparently there remains some
uncertainty about long-run effects on donors.)
It is even more difficult to arrive at any estimate of the sources of
blood by type of donor. A knowledgeable person could no doubt quar-
rel with Titmuss's guesses, but it is unlikely that he is so far off as to
render his general picture false. He distinguishes eight types of donors,
but some of these are minor variations on others. The figures are for
1965-67 and may be changing. About a third of all blood comes from
paid donors, some of whom sell their blood occasionally, some regu.
larly. This fraction includes a small amount from donors who receive
a cash payment, but whose main reason for "volunteering" may be
group pressure from a trade union or other organization with a quota
it would like to fill. A little over half of all blood comes from those who
are in effect exchanging blood for blood. Some of them are making
"insurance deposits"; for instance, a donation of one pint a year by
some member of a family insures all members of the immediate family
for their blood needs for that year. (There are also policies which, in
exchange for cash premiums, insure against the cash costs of blood, but
these, of course, are not sources of blood to the system.) Other people
give blood in exchange for blood already received. Hospitals levy a
cash charge per unit of blood delivered to patients; in the 1960s a
typical charge was $30-$100 a pint, and for some types of surgery many
pints are required. As an alternative to cash payment, the patient is
urged to replace the blood he has used with his own blood or with that
from one or more friends, relatives, hired donors, or members of a
"blood plan group" to which the patient belongs for just such con-
tingencies. Many hospitals require the patient to supply two units of
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About five per cent of all blood comes from "captive voluntary do-
nors," mostly servicemen and prisoners. Some prisoners receive a small
cash payment. In some states there appears to be formal remission of
sentences as a reward for donation of blood; one presumes that gen-
erally parole boards look more kindly on prisoners whose records show a
history of blood donation. (In Britain, according to Titmuss, prisoners
are treated like other members of the community and allowed to volun-
teer. There is no formal reward of any kind, but it is difficult, as he
says, to know how the prisoners themselves see the situation.) The re-
maining ten per cent of all blood supplied in the United States comes
from the voluntary donor, who is the source of essentially all blood in
Great Britain.4
These figures exclude blood components collected in plasmapheresis
programs. Such programs draw entirely on paid donors, some "walk-
in," some essentially salaried. When they are added in, about half of
all blood is bought for cash, about forty per cent is exchanged for other
blood, about seven per cent is voluntarily given, and the residue comes
from the captive voluntary donor.5
Only the most fragmentary information exists on the demographic
and socio-economic classification of blood donors. One blood bank,
drawing mainly on replacement and individual and group credit do-
nors, found that its donors were predominantly male, and somewhat
younger and of higher socio-economic status than the community at
large. Presumably this reflects the middle-class character of most tied
programs. Data from blood banks, whether profit-making or not, which
draw mainly on paid donors exhibit the expected heavy dependence on
the low-paid occupational groups and, especially, on the unemployed.
The Skid Row donor is real, but there are, no doubt, some who sell
blood for bread, not booze.
II.
Which system works better? Even leaving aside moral and aesthetic
considerations, there are several criteria against which one could judge.
On all of them, the British seem to do as well or better, usually much
better.
Both systems manage to collect about the same amount of blood in
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The statistics do not permit any precise comparison. Nevertheless, the
official figures for England and Wales show that in the late 1960s the
number of donations was about three per hundred of population; the
fragmentary data for the United States suggest something similar.
Plasmapheresis adds something to the American collections.
On the other hand, a much larger fraction of the available blood is
wasted in the United States. (Blood can be safely stored only for about
tventy days; outdated blood can, however, be converted to dried plasma
and other products which last for much longer.) If conversion to plasma
is not counted as waste, only a tiny fraction of blood collected in En-
gland and Wales is wasted-something like one to two per cent. On this
question the American statistics are particularly unsatisfactory, with
differential under-reporting of collections and transfusions, and no clear
measure of the amount of outdated blood converted to plasma. In some
years the apparent gap between collections and transfusions is as much
as a third of collections. Actual waste must be less, because of conver-
sion. If the rate of conversion is extrapolated from British data, and
other similar guesses are made, it appears that the wastage rate in the
United States is no lower than ten per cent of collections and may be
higher than that. One may say, then, that the American system wastes
about ten times as much blood as the British, proportionately, despite
the fact that blood is expensive in the United States and "free" in Great
Britain. 6
This waste results from defects in planning and administration, from
failures to match demand and supply properly, from the over-ordering
and hoarding of blood by hospitals and blood banks, from incorrect
estimates of the demand for blood by type, from transportation delays,
and other such factors in the system. A different kind of waste is the
medically unnecessary use of blood, but of course it is intrinsically
impossible to have complete data on this. One survey in London sug-
gested that six and one-half per cent of the blood use was medically
unnecessary. One is tempted to say that the figure must be lower in a
system in which hospitals and patients pay for blood, but it is precisely
Titmuss's point that one ought not to say that, and the figures on ad-
ministrative waste suggest that he is right. In any case, unnecessary sur-
gery and unnecessary transfusions are certainly not unknown in the
United States, but Titmuss quotes no figure comparable with the one
just given for London. He mentions one survey of five common opera.
6. Pp. 22-23, 56-58.
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tions on two million patients in 1959-1962 which estimated a waste of
160,000 pints of blood, but gives no survey figure for the total use of
blood, which could, but need not, exceed 2,000,000 pints.7
Waste of blood is not logically incompatible with the existence of
occasional -and local shortages of blood; supreme inefficiency might
permit waste and near-chronic shortage to co-exist. Here again, Titmuss
argues that the British system has proved superior. He claims that there
have not been any significant or prolonged shortages of blood in En-
gland and Wales since 1948. In contrast, he is able to cite a number of
statements by American students and medical men asserting that many
hospitals and areas are chronically short of blood, and that elective
surgery is frequently postponed or cancelled because the required blood
is unavailable. He concludes: "Among the large urban and metro-
politan areas only a minority of places.., appear to have no chronic
shortages of fresh blood. Generally, throughout the United States, there
are widespread reports from many areas and by numerous experts of
actual and potential demand exceeding the available supply of blood."8
This is not quite the same thing as data. Some mildly contradictory
evidence is contained in a small mail survey of consultants to the Na-
tional Blood Transfusion Service conducted by two English economists.0
It is a very small sample, with a response rate of only about a half. But
thirty-six per cent of the surgeons who replied reported that they had
"sometimes" postponed operations for lack of blood supply. (Another
one per cent replied that they had "often" done so.) Some twenty-two
per cent had "sometimes" experienced undue delay in obtaining emer-
gency supplies through the NBTS (plus two per cent who had "often"
experienced such delays). Nevertheless, in the full sample of physicians
and surgeons, fifty-five per cent characterized the blood supplies to their
hospitals as "excellent," forty-one per cent as "adequate," and only four
per cent as "poor." It is very difficult to weigh this sort of evidence
against a culling of alarmist statements about the situation in the United
States. It is hard to escape the conclusion, however, that the British have
it at least an order of magnitude better.
There is one other standard against which one can compare the two
7. Pp. 196-97.
8. P. 65.
9. M. COOPER 8 A. CULYER, THE PICE OF BLOOD 18-19 (1968). It should be noted that
Cooper and Culyer are diametricaly at odds with Titmuss s attitudes; their pamphlet is
indeed an attempt to make the case for the buying and selling of blood in Britain. I shal
come back to it later.
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systems for supplying blood: the quality of the product. The main risk
is serum hepatitis, incurred by transfusion recipients from contaminated
blood. There are reports that three and six-tenths per cent of all trans-
fused hospital patients in the United States later contracted the disease.
Serum hepatitis has been said by the Journal of the American Medical
Association to cause death in about one of 150 transfusions in persons
older than forty (who receive much of the blood).,0 In Great Britain, no
study (there have only been a few) shows the incidence of hepatitis
following transfusions to be greater than one per cent, and the most
recent study estimates the risk to be negligible."1
There appears to be no practical way to test donated blood for hepati-
tis. The only protection against contaminated blood is the willingness of
the prospective donor to report that he has had or been exposed to
hepatitis, if he knows it. It is evident that in any system in which blood
is sold for money by donors who need the money, the donor has a motive
to conceal his history of hepatitis if he has one and knows it. Further,
since sellers of blood will come predominantly from the poor-not to
mention the Skid Row syndrome-prospective donors can be expected
to have a higher incidence of hepatitis than the population at large, and
less knowledge of it. It is hardly a surprise, then, that "many studies in
different parts of the United States have incriminated the paid donor
(and blood obtained from commercial blood banks) as the major source
of infection."' 2
Moreover, hepatitis can be transmitted in plasma as well as in whole
blood. Since plasma is often pooled from the blood of several hundred
donors, one or two of whom can infect the whole lot, the risk from large-
pool plasma is very high, though it is cheap and easy to process. In Brit-
ain, the risk is recognized and small-pool plasma (from fewer than ten
donors) became the rule in 1945.13
By all these measures-and remember that I have not yet mentioned
the morality of a system in which poor people sell their blood for the use
of rich people who buy it-the British system seems to be far more effi-
cient-more economical, one might say-than the American. There is a
certain paradox, then, in the fact that in England blood is free, whereas
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III.
Titmuss thinks he understands why this happens, though I do not
recall that he ever states clearly and concisely his view of the causal
connection. I imagine it goes something like this.
Contrary to the view of "economists," it is precisely the element of
commercialism that causes the American system to operate so badly,
and precisely its absence that permits the British system to operate so
well. There is in ordinary people a very large (inexhaustible?) fund of
altruism, of feelings of solidarity, of willingness or need to enter into
gift relationships. 14 The British system taps this and finds as much
as it needs.
Even a small admixture of commercialism, however, is enough to
poison the well. The altruistic impulse is diminished or destroyed by the
realization that what one is offering as a gift others are selling as a com-
modity. The existence of a market sector thus contaminates the volun-
tary system. The attitude of personal caring disappears; perhaps this
accounts for the greater waste in the American system. Titmuss goes so
far as to argue that the buying and selling of some blood is a narrowing
of the freedom of potential voluntary donors; it restricts the "freedom to
give" because one can not give and get satisfaction from giving what is
elsewhere entering the market.10
It is not a convincing argument. We can all agree on one point, that
the use of paid donors must be responsible for the substantial and grow-
ing risk of hepatitis from transfusion. A history of hepatitis and the
14. Obviously the gift of blood is not like a birthday present. Usually the donor and
recipient never meet, do not know each other, do not even know each other's name. Nor
is there really much resemblance between giving blood and the Melanesian kula or the
Pacific Northwest potlatch, as Titmuss suggests there is. See M. fAuss, TaE GIrF (. Cun-
nison transl. 1954) (originally published in 1925 as FSsAi suR LE Do., Foflmm AnCjlAqUE DE
L'CaMNGE). The latter customs are in large part formal ceremonies; there is also a much
larger element of exchange, and a definite tinge of aggression (Id. at 35). One motive for
giving blood is certainly the wish to help maintain a s)stem of which one might sometime
be a beneficiary. But more usually it seems closer to a contribution than to a gift, for
example the donation of goods or money to the victims of a famine or a flood. It is an
important element, I think, that the thing given has only slight value to the giver, but
very great value to the recipient.
15. At times one senses that Titmuss is going even further, to a claim that doing axay
with markets not only avoids pollution of altruism, but absolutely encourages more
altruism. This line of argument is similar to the claim of anarchists, from Godwin to
Kropotkin, that if only the whole panoply of harmful institutions could be disassembled,
there would be found enough sense of one's responsibility for others, enough mutual
aid, to provide for everyone's needs without compulsion. This claim is difficult enough
to evaluate when made cleanly. But it is not Titmuss's claim. At least in this book,
Titmuss seems to suggest that a fund of altruism can be released in one context at a time,
vithout need for a transformation of society altogether. The selling of soap is commercial
in Britain too. In any event, Titmuss has trouble enough advancing the position that
markets are evil because they kill altruism. This review is directed at that narrower thesis.
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motive to conceal it are likely to coincide only in those who sell blood
for money. But the rest of the story seems far-fetched. I know that on
none of the many occasions on which I have failed to appear at the
local Bloodmobile has my realization of the existence of a market in
blood played the slightest part. Each reader of this review can ask
himself the same question. Professor Nathan Glazer did ask some stu-
dents on the occasion of a Harvard University blood drive; this con-
sideration was never raised.'0 I would be tempted to guess that the
historical connection was just the reverse: that the purchase-and-sale
sector made headway in the United States only when the voluntary
system proved inadequate to supply the medical needs for blood.
There are some tantalizing loose ends in Titmuss's work that might
have yielded more light on this issue had they been followed up. In
isolation, they merely cast doubt on Titmuss's hypothesis. We learn, for
instance, that ". . . Seattle, which had one of the best organized and
effective blood banking and cross-matching agencies in the country...,
and which collected 35,000 units annually, reported in recent years an
outdating proportion of less than 2 per cent."' 7 One wonders why. Was
there no access to paid donors in Seattle, or did hospitals there charge
patients in some different and less commercial way? We are not told,
though there is an indication that Seattle did have commercial blood
banking, and even bought blood from derelicts.18
Similarly, the chapter on practices in other countries is all too short.
One table states that half of the blood used in the Soviet Union comes
from paid doners (and the fee paid is very high), as does forty per cent
in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and seventy-five per cent in Rumania.""
One would like to know the consequences of the purchase of blood in
those very different institutional settings. It turns out that East Germany
pays eighty-five per cent of its donors and West Germany something
between forty and eighty-five per cent. Surely it would be interesting
to compare those two systems. Denmark buys "some," and Sweden buys
all of its blood though patients are not charged; France bought a "small"
amount, and Italy a "substantial" amount in 1950-60.20 How much dif-
ference does this make in the way the system works?
I do not mean to make work for an author, but merely to suggest that
there may not be enough information in a simple comparison of Brit-
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ain and the United States to support any firm conclusion whatever
about the causes of the difference in efficiency. It would be equally
plausible, I think, to connect the difference in blood distribution sys-
tems with other historically conditioned differences between Great
Britain in particular and the United States in particular, not least the
existence of the National Health Service itself. More fancifully, I suspect
there is a trace of Dunkirk still in those voluntary blood-donation ses-
sions,21 or a little bit of the tight little island with its tradition of civic-
mindedness, as compared with the larger, ethnically and geographically
more heterogeneous, society of the United States. To put it at its strong-
est, I doubt that abolishing the purchase of blood or payment for
transfusions would transform the American blood collection and dis-
tribution system into something that worked as well as the British.22
This is not the only instance in which Professor Titmuss overesti-
mates the cogency of his argument. At another point he refers to an
earlier discussion of the "social costs arising from the wastes, shortages,
inefficiencies, unethical practices and hazards involved in the American
commercial blood market. We concluded that despite the difficulties of
measuring such costs in money terms a disproportionate part was borne
by poor people, the sick and the handicapped. '( " I presume that he is
referring back to pages 200-01, but what is found there is by no stretch
of the imagination evidence or argument, but merely the same asser-
tion, in roughly the same words. It may in fact be true that the cost of
the inefficiency of the American system is distributed regressively be-
tween rich and poor, but to say so twice is not more convincing than to
say so once.
IV.
Even if Titmuss fails to produce a convincing explanation of the
success of the British system and the failure of the American, the facts
21. It is remarkable that in a sample survey of donors' self-perceived reasons for first
giving blood, almost twelve per cent of the responses mentioned the 1939-45 war effort
or experience in the armed services. Some of another three and one-half per cent
classified under "Duty" harked back to the war. And this is a sample in which older
people are under-represented. (Some of the donors who began in the Armed Services
mention the bait of an off-duty afternoon, or even pressure from above. This is hardly in
the Dunkirk line. On the other hand, those replies may be more manner than substance-
the respondents are after all back again as purely voluntary donors.)
22. It is doubtful that the American blood system can be transformed at all, except as
part of a broader transformation of the whole system for the delivery of medical care.
Indeed the waste of blood, so much larger here than in England, occurs after the blood
has entered the larger medical system.
23. P. 221.
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themselves pose more of a challenge to "economists" than to him. Dennis
Robertson once gave a talk entitled "What Do Economists Economize?"
His answer was "love"; he meant that altruism is a scarce resource, and
the business of economists is to find institutional arrangements that will
accomplish society's purposes without depending too much on dis-
interested kindness. That is what economists since Adam Smith have
found so fascinating about the competitive market: that the unrestricted
interaction of self-interested people under appropiate conditions
24 re-
sults in an outcome with certain socially desirable properties willed by
none of them.
It is a routine observation that when a resource is made available at
a price that does not adequately reflect its scarcity, it will be used waste-
fully, i.e., in low-priority rather than in high-priority ways (perhaps
including conservation). That is the standard case for tolls on congested
roads and effluent charges on polluted rivers. Here we are presented
with a case in which free blood is adequately supplied and carefully hus-
banded, while dear blood is wasted and contaminated. Is this reason
to doubt the case for congestion tolls and effluent charges? I don't think
so. But it is reason to remember that economic reasoning applies only
where economic motives predominate.
It is one thing to suggest that the supply of altruism is limited and
quite another thing to pretend that no motive but greed ever operated,
even "in our culture." It is fair comment, I fear, that some devoted
marketeers do just that. There is a pretty example of this in Cooper and
Culyer. They say, discussing waste of blood: "If the price (of blood) to
hospitals is zero, there will be no incentive to conserve blood to the
limit, and hence the amount that would be considered 'adequate' will
be larger than the amount that would be considered 'adequate' if a
price had to be paid."2 5 It is a standard economic argument, and I have
no doubt that it applies in those situations that are institutionalized as
"economic." But it is certainly gratuitous to assert that doctors and
hospital administrators respond, presumably necessarily respond, to
no other stimulus but money. That assertion is not itself economics: it
is psychology, and very likely bad psychology.
Over-enthusiastic marketeers sometimes fall into another bad habit.
It is a kind of cultivated moral obtuseness. Here is an example from
24. The conditions are pretty stringent: they include the ready availability of knowli-
edge about prices and V roducts to all participants, the absence of monopoly, and the
insignificance of those 'externalities" that are now beginning to seem very significant
indeed.
25. M. CooPER & A. CULYER, supra note 9, at 21.
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Cooper and Culyer. The text of their pamphlet nowhere mentions the
hepatitis problem as a possible or even probable consequence of the
introduction of a commercial market for blood. At the end, however,
there are some suggested questions for discussion. One of them reads:
"There is evidence to show that blood from 'professional' donors is more
likely to carry disease. What difference does this make to the economic
analysis of this Paper?" And the next question goes: "Is it right to sub-
ject patients to additional risks by transfusing them with inferior blood?
Compare your answer with treatment by inferior surgeons, hospitals,
etc. If inferiority is a reflection of the fundamental fact of scarcity, can
anything be done to remove it?"20
I am afraid I can imagine what they would find an acceptable answer
to these questions. It would presumably involve the labelling of some
blood as "risky" and some as "safe." (Since blood cannot practicably be
tested for safety, presumably all blood from paid donors would have to
be labelled as risky; perhaps one can imagine several grades according
to the type of donor-alcoholic, penniless artist, poor but honest,
little old lady. But the grade-labelling would have to be policed to avoid
cheating, so there is danger of interference with economic liberty even
here.) Risky blood would of course sell at a lower price than safe blood.
Poor people would buy cheap blood; rich people could afford safe blood.
If that strikes you as awful, reflect on the fundamental fact of scarcity.
Upon reflection, it may not be clear to you that the mere fact of scarcity
implies that the quality of blood a man receives should be correlated
with his capacity to earn income.27 You may even be troubled by the
fact that the risky blood gets introduced into an otherwise reasonably
satisfactory situation only through Cooper and Culyer's belief that
buying and selling blood is a useful practice. Suppose that the intro-
duction of a commercial market would in fact result in some marginal
improvement in efficiency (though Titmuss's story suggests it wouldn't).
The judgment that such an improvement could justify the creation of
differentials in quality of blood received by income class does strike me
as morally obtuse.
This leads to a deeper and more important point. In their enthusiasm
for market allocations, many economists seem to drift into assertions
that go beyond what economic analysis will support. The nice thing
26. Id. at 46.
27. Should the cut of meat a man eats be correlated with his capacity to earn income?
It would carry me too far afield to discuss that question here. Perhaps most readers would
agree that it is worse that poor people should be tramfused with riky blood than that
they should eat inferior meat.
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about free competitive markets is that-under the right conditions, some
of which I mentioned earlier-they lead to outcomes that are Pareto-
efficient or Pareto-optimal, to use the technical term. That means that
the final situation is such that no physically feasible shift of resources
could make everyone better off (or at least make some people better off
without making anyone worse off). "Better off" means better off in one's
own estimation.
Inefficient situations are clearly bad in the sense that some physically
feasible efficient situation can be found in which everyone is better
off. It would be better to be in that efficient situation. Any efficient
situation is certainly better than certain inefficient situations, namely,
those in which everyone is worse off. But it is definitely not true that
any efficient situation is better than any inefficient situation. A may be
an efficient situation and B an inefficient one; but some people may be
better off in B than they would be in A, though others must be better off
in A. We would say that the distribution of income differs between A
and B. The economist has no technical right to recommend a move
from B to A. He can recommend a move from B to one of the efficient
situations that is clearly superior to B, say C; or, which comes to the
same thing, he could recommend a move from B to A accompanied by a
redistribution of income that would be, in effect, a move from A to C.
Without the redistribution, there is no sense in which A is economically
better than B.
This is old stuff in welfare economics, but it is sometimes forgotten
in the heat of advocacy. Suppose some scarce resource is being distrib-
uted free or at some artificially low (or high) price that does not ade-
quately reflect the cost of making it available. If economic motives
predominate, the resource will be over-used (or under-used) in the
sense that everyone could be made better off if less (or more) of this
resource were produced and consumed and the production and con-
sumption of other things were increased (or decreased). This is Cooper
and Culyer's case for pricing blood, except that they merely assume that
only economic motives can matter. Going over to rational pricing will
almost always have distributional effects as well as efficiency effects; in
fact there is usually a sense in which the distributional effects are first-
order and the efficiency effects second-order. Suppose I protest that the
introduction of rational pricing will hurt the poor or the innocent or
the worthy and help the rich or the slick or the unworthy. The mar-
keteer's response is that the right way to help the poor is directly through
transfers of purchasing power; there is no virtue in generating waste-
ful misallocation of resources in order to bring about a desirable
1708
Vol. 80: 1696, 1971
Blood and Thunder
distribution of income when direct non-distorting methods are avail-
able. He is right about that. Well, then, he goes on, you think about
what to do next, and in the meanwhile let's have rational pricing of
whatever-it-is and get rid of the inefficiency. But there he is wrong. An
improvement in efficiency accompanied by adverse distributional ef-
fects is not a good thing pending corrective redistribution. It is a good
thing only when it is accompanied by corrective redistribution.
This proposition cuts both ways. I have alluded to the unattractiveness
of a system in which the poor sell their blood to the rich. The mar-
keteer replies: to eliminate that possibility will do harm to the poor
as well as to the rich, perhaps more harm to the poor than to the rich.
Leaving aside addicts, alcoholics, and other incompetents, those who sell
blood receive something in exchange of greater value to them, else they
wouldn't do as they do. Now it is my turn to say that there are better
ways of increasing the income of the poor to the point where they would
cease supplying blood for money even if the opportunity remained.
But it is not enough to say that there are better ways. Unless they are
actually effective, to cut off the option of selling blood is to satisfy my
moral judgments at the expense of those who would voluntarily choose
that option.
In summary, some of Timuss's complaints about the enthusiasts of
the market are valid. But they are valid complaints about invalid
overextensions of economic reasoning, not about economic reasoning
itself. The dichotomy between efficiency and distribution is a necessary
analytical distinction, not a justification for regressive policy measures.
V.
There is another side to the coin. Efficiency in the use of scarce re-
sources is a worthwhile goal. If you believe that, and if you believe, in
addition, that autonomy of the individual decision-making person is a
good thing, then you ought to find the free competitive market an
attractive way to organize a lot of activities, provided the distribution
of income is fair. In a society of equals or near-equals, one might even
look more kindly on the sale of blood, though I can easily understand
and share the feeling that might make one wish to prevent it as one
would wish to prevent people from selling their eyes or kidneys or votes
or selling themselves into slavery.
Titmuss, on the contrary, is rather down on buying and selling,
sometimes for defensible reasons, sometimes for poor reasons, sometimes
for reasons of taste on which right-thinking people need not agree. For
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example, there are some things or services that are best kept from the
market, not because it would be technically difficult or inefficient to
market them, but because the "social" consequences would be bad even
if the narrowly "economic" consequences were good. I would rather
say that if, in total, the social consequences are bad then the economic
consequences are bad too, and only appear to be good because the
accounting is incomplete. But that is a quibble about words; the point
is that it may well be socially destructive to admit the routine exchange-
ability of certain things. We would prefer to maintain that they are
beyond price (although this sometimes means only that we would prefer
not to know what the price really is).
I have already mentioned Titmuss's argument that the economist's
attempts to economize on altruism merely destroy more altruism than
they save. There is no intellectual difficulty here; anyone, economist or
other, would recognize that as false economy. But Titmuss makes a very
weak case for this belief; it can hardly be regarded as established in
general, or even in the specific instance of blood donation.
A less legitimate argument occasionally crops up in this book and
elsewhere. It is an old thought that to put something in correspondence
with "money" is to dirty or demean it. But there is a confusion here.
Money itself is surely more or less irrelevant; a return to barter would
not eliminate the moral problems connected with buying and selling.
Whenever people must choose among alternatives, they must somehow
reduce their preferences to some kind of common denominator, if only
the intensity of desire itself: I want X more than Y and Y more than Z,
so that if presented with a choice I will choose X. If people must ex-
change with one another, they will certainly have to represent and
discuss the terms on which they are prepared to exchange units of X for
Y and units of Y for Z. I can see no special moral problem that arises
when relative prices are expressed in money terms. Quite the contrary,
though it has become less fashionable to say so, there are real moral as
well as economic advantages in having an impersonal, universalistic way
for people to express and exhibit the strength of their preferences. Pre-
scription by authority or ascription by custom and status are not always
attractive alternatives to the market registration of the sum of individual
wishes.
Allocation through a market will work only where autonomous indivi.
duals must exchange resources, each trying to do the best for himself
according to his own preferences. Allocation through a market will seem
morally right only in spheres in which self-interest is an approved motive
and it is felt to be right that individual preferences should count. It
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would be a grim world if that covered everything. But it would be a
very difficult world to organize in a decentralized way if that covered
nothing. Given rough equality, I should think the free market provides
a tolerable and even preferable way of organizing a fairly large area of
economic activity. One of the reasons Professor Titmuss disagrees-if,
as I think, he does disagree-is that he seems to attribute somewhat less
importance to the notion that individual preferences should count.
There is a slight, rather typically Fabian, authoritarian streak in Tit-
muss; he seems to believe that ordinary people ought to be happy to
have many decisions made for them by professional experts who will,
fortunately, often turn out to be moderately well-bom Englishmen.
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